Abstract Previous work has shown that cluster analysis can be used to effectively classify malware into meaningful families. In this research, we apply cluster analysis to the challenging problem of classifying previously unknown malware. We perform several experiments involving malware clustering. We compare our clustering results to those obtained when a support vector machine (SVM) is trained on the malware family. Using clustering, we are able to classify malware with an accuracy comparable to that of an SVM. An advantage of the clustering approach is that a new malware family can be classified before a model has been trained specifically for the family.
Introduction
Malware is software that is designed to cause harm by, for example, gaining access to private computer systems, stealing sensitive information, infecting files on the system, or spreading its infection. To avoid such malicious activity, malware must be detected and removed from a computer system. However, advanced malware can be challenging to detect.
Stuxnet is an example of highly advanced malware. The Stuxnet worm was apparently designed to attack industrial programmable logic controllers in Iran's nuclear facilities [30] . Stuxnet took advantage of several zero-day vulnerabilities and it spread to air-gapped networks via removable USB flash drives. Stuxnet also includes a rootkit component which helps it to hide its malicious activity, thereby making detection more difficult.
Koobface is another recent example of advanced malware. This malware was designed to target users of social networking websites, including Facebook and Twitter, as well as Skype and email services such as gmail and Yahoo mail. The Koobface infection is spread via spam that is sent through social networking websites. On an infected system Koobface gathers login credentials and user profiles. One of the components of Koobface blocks the user from accessing anti-virus or security websites [29] .
According to [28] , traditional signature scanning is insufficient to meet the threat posed by advanced malware. In this paper, we apply hidden Markov model (HMM) analysis and clustering techniques to the problem of classifying malware. This problem was inspired by previous research in malware classification [2, 3] . In the research presented here, we first train an HMM for each of several malware families or compiler types. The resulting models are then used to score samples from these same malware families. Based on the HMM scores, the malware samples are grouped into clusters using the K -means [1] and expectation maximization (EM) [7] clustering algorithms.
We then score samples from malware families that were not used for training or generating the clusters, and we classify these new samples based on the existing clusters. The goal is to determine how well we can classify new malware families using cluster results based on a set of previously-known malware families. Our results show that this HMM-based clustering yields comparable results to those obtained when a support vector machine is trained specifically for each malware family. A disadvantage of the SVM approach (or any similar technique) is that we must gather a substantial number of samples from a new malware family and train a model before we can detect the family. In contrast, for our clustering technique, we can immediately detect samples from a new malware family-even before we know that a new malware family exists.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we discuss background topics, with the emphasis on Hidden Markov Models and the clustering techniques used in our experiments. We also briefly discuss Support Vector Machines. In Sect. 3, our experimental results are presented and analyzed. Finally, Sect. 4 contains our conclusion and suggestions for future work.
Background
In this section, we discuss relevant background topics. First, we cover hidden Markov models, which we use to compute scores that form the basis for all of our experiments. Then we consider the K -means and EM clustering techniques, which we use in our experiments to classify malware. Support vector machines (SVMs) are also discussed. We experiment with SVMs to provide a baseline to compare against our clustering results. Finally, we mention ROC analysis, which is used as a measure of success in our experiments.
Hidden Markov models
A Markov process is a statistical model with known states and state transition probabilities. A hidden Markov model (HMM) can be viewed as a Markov model with "hidden" states. Table 1 provides standard notation used with HMMs [22] .
An HMM is defined by the three matrices A, B and π . Each of these matrices is row stochastic, that is, every row satisfies the conditions of a discrete probability distribution. We denote an HMM as λ = (A, B, π) . Figure 1 illustrates a generic hidden Markov model, where the part above the dashed line is hidden, in the sense that we cannot directly observe the state sequence. However, we can see the observation sequence, and the states are related to the observations via the probability distributions contained in the B matrix. The usefulness of HMMs derives primarily from the fact that there exist efficient algorithms to solve each of the following three problems [22] .
Problem 1 Given the model λ = (A, B, π) and an observation sequence O, determine P(O|λ). That is, we can score a given observation sequence against a given model. (A, B, π) and an observation sequence O, determine the most likely (hidden) state sequence X . That is, we can, in a sense, uncover the most likely hidden states.
Problem 2 Given the model λ =

Problem 3
Given an observation sequence O and the dimensions N and M, determine the model λ that maximizes the probability of O. That is, we can train a model that best fits a given observation sequence.
For the research presented in this paper, we train HMMs for different compilers and malware families, based on extracted opcode sequences. The resulting HMM models are used to score a large collection of malware and benign samples. Specifically, we use the solution to Problem 3 to train models, and the solution to Problem 1 to score malware samples. We then apply cluster analysis to the resulting HMM scores.
The details of the HMM algorithms are beyond the scope of this paper. For more information on HMMs, see [22] or [17] . For examples of research involving the use of HMMs for malware analysis, see, for example, [2, 31] .
Clustering
Clustering is the process of grouping related objects together. Clustering is frequently used in statistical data analysis, data exploration, pattern recognition, and so on. In this section, we discuss the K -means and EM clustering algorithms in some detail.
K -Means
Suppose that we are given a set of data points, say, x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m , and we want to group these points into K clusters. Further, suppose that we have K distinguished points, c 1 , c 2 , . . . , c K , which we refer to as centroids. Each centroid can be viewed as the center of mass of its corresponding cluster. Also, we assume that we have a distance function d(x, y) that is defined on the data points x i .
Let centroid(x i ) be the centroid of the cluster to which x i is assigned. Now, suppose that we want to solve the following problem. 
Finding an exact solution to this problem is NP-complete. But, there is a simple iterative process that often yields a good approximation. We claim that any solution to (1) must satisfy the following conditions.
• Condition 1-Each x i is clustered according to its nearest centroid. That is, if x i belongs to cluster j, Condition 1 is obvious-if x i is in cluster j and d(x i , c ) < d(x i , c j ) for some = j, then moving x i to cluster will reduce distortion K . Condition 2 seems intuitively clear and can be rigorously proved using elementary calculus [1] .
From Condition 1, we see that we can improve a clustering by simply reassigning data points to their nearest centroid. Condition 2 implies that for any clustering we always want the centroids to be at the center of the clusters. Therefore, given any clustering, we could perform the following two steps.
• Step 1-Assign each data point to its nearest centroid.
• Step 2-Compute each centroid to be the center of its cluster.
After performing these steps, the new clusters would be at least as good as the previous clusters, with respect to the measure distortion K . It is clear that nothing can be gained by applying either Step 1 or Step 2 more than once in succession. However, by alternating between these two steps, we obtain an iterative process that yields a series of solutions that will generally tend to improve, and even in the worst case, the solution cannot get worse. This is precisely the K -means algorithm [14] , which we state somewhat more precisely in Table 2 . Note that the stopping criteria could be that distortion K improves (i.e., decreases) by less than a set threshold, or that the centroids do not change by much, or we could simply run the algorithm for a fixed number of iterations.
The K -means algorithm in Table 2 can be viewed as a hill climb. As with most hill climb algorithms, in K -means we are only assured of a local maximum, and the local maximum we find depends heavily on the initial conditions-in the case of K -means, the initial selection of centroids. Therefore, it is common practice to repeat the algorithm multiple times with different selections of initial centroids.
Expectation maximization
Expectation maximization (EM) clustering is an unsupervised, iterative technique that is designed to find the maximum likelihood estimates of parameters from the data. That is, we determine the parameters of K probability distributions that specify the clusters.
One obvious difficulty with clustering based on probability distributions is that such distributions are almost certainly not known a priori. In fact, we likely do not even know what type of probability distribution (Gaussian, exponential, etc.) will yield the best results. Consequently, EM can be viewed as clustering based on "hidden" probability distributions, which is somewhat analogous to the process used to train an HMM. In fact, the HMM training algorithm is a form of expectation maximization.
We now show that the EM clustering algorithm also bears a striking resemblance to the K -means algorithm discussed above. As with K -means, in EM clustering, we have an optimization problem that cannot be solved directly. And as in K -means, there is a two-step iterative hill-climb process for EM clustering. Again, it makes no sense to apply either step more than once in succession, but by alternating between the two steps, we generally make progress-and in any case, can never obtain a worse result.
The K -means algorithm can be paraphrased as follows.
• Step 1-Recompute clusters based on current centroids • Step 2-Recompute the centroids
That is, in
Step 1 of K -means, we determine the "shape" of the clusters, while in Step 2 we re-estimate the important parameters (i.e., the centroids). In EM clustering, there is an expectation (E) and a maximization (M) step. These steps can be summarized as
• E step-Recompute probabilities needed in the M step • M step-Recompute maximum likelihood estimators
In the E step, we recompute the "shape" of the clusters based on our current estimate of the probability distributions. This is analogous to Step 1 in the K -means algorithm. Then in the M step, we re-estimate the crucial parameters of the probability distributions (specifically, the mean and variance of each probability distribution). The E step is analogous to Step 1 in K -means, while the M step is analogous to Step 2 of the K -means algorithm.
Perhaps the most significant difference between K -means and EM is that in the former we make a "hard" decision in
Step 1, in the sense that each data point is assigned to a cluster. In contrast, the E step in the EM algorithm only assigns probabilities, which can be viewed as making a "soft" assignment to a cluster. In fact, in EM, every point has a probability of being associated with every cluster, which can be viewed as a "fuzzy" approach to clustering. Typically, we would assign points to the cluster for which the probability is largest, but it would also be reasonable in some cases to "split" points between clusters, based on the relative probabilities, or to give a confidence factor to each point, again based on its probability relative to a given cluster. For additional details on EM clustering, see [5] or [23] .
Cluster validation
Given clusters for a set of data points, there are many ways to measure the quality of the clustering. Here, we briefly discuss a few such measures that will be used in our experiments in Sect. 3. Let x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m be a set of data points consisting of n different types of data, and let C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C K a set of clusters of these points. That is, each data point is assigned to exactly one cluster. Let m j be the number of elements in cluster C j and let m i j the number of elements of type i in cluster C j . Then the probability of data of type i relative to cluster j is given by p i j = m i j /m j .
Entropy provides a useful measure of cluster quality [11, 23, 27] . The entropy of cluster C j is given by
Note that the higher the entropy, the less uniform is the cluster.
The (weighted) intra-cluster entropy is given by
Intuitively, the smaller E, the better the clustering, since a small value of E indicates more uniformity within the clusters. Purity is another measure of uniformity [11, 23, 27] . Ideally, a cluster should consist entirely of data points of one particular type. Using the same notation as above, the purity of a cluster C j is given by
The overall (weighted) purity is given by
The closer that U is to 1, the more uniform are the clusters. Ideally, we would want U to be close to 1. Intuitively, we want the data points within a cluster to be tightly packed, and we want the clusters themselves to be well separated from each other. These properties are referred to as cohesion and separation, respectively. These two properties can be combined into a single quality measure known as the silhouette coefficient [11, 23, 27] . The silhouette coefficient of data point x i is given by
where a is the average distance of x i to the data points in its cluster and b is the minimum of the average distances of x i to data points in another cluster. Figure 2 illustrates the silhouette coefficient. In general, for a reasonable clustering, we have b > a, and hence
As previously mentioned, ideally, we want x i to be cohesive with respect to the data points in its own cluster and well separated from the data points in other clusters. Consequently, in the ideal case, S(x i ) ≈ 1.
Support vector machines
Support vector machines (SVMs) are one of the most popular supervised learning algorithms for binary classification and regression analysis. Supervised learning methods deal with labeled data, which means that the training data must be preprocessed so that the labels are known. Given such labeled training data, the SVM algorithm yields a hyperplane that separates the data into two classes. This hyperplane is optimal in the sense that the separation between the two classes (i.e., the margin) is maximized [24] . Figure 3 illustrates an optimal hyperplane (the solid yellow line) separating the red circles from the blue squares.
SVMs separate data using a (linear) hyperplane. However, data points are often not linearly separable. To overcome this limitation, SVMs employ the so-called "kernel trick", whereby the data is mapped to a higher dimensional space. In this higher dimensional space, it is more likely that the data will be linearly separable. Figure 4 illustrates the kernel trick, where the function φ has mapped the 2-dimensional data into 3-dimensional space. The data on the lefthand side of Fig. 4 is not linearly separable, since no hyperplane (i.e., line) can separate the two sets. However, in the higher dimensional space on the righthand side of Fig. 4 , we can easily separate the data sets using a hyperplane (i.e., a plane).
In practice, the selection of the SVM kernel function is critical. In Sect. 3, we experiment with a variety of standard kernel functions.
ROC curves
In this research, we employ receiver operating characteristic (ROC) [8] analysis as a means of quantifying the success of our experiments. To construct an ROC curve, we begin with a scatterplot of results. In our context, this scatterplot contains a set of scores for malware files and a set of scores for representative benign files. To obtain the ROC curve, the true positive rate is plotted against the false positive rate as the threshold varies through the range of data values. The area under the ROC curve (AUC) provides a useful measure of the quality of a binary classifier [6] . An AUC of 1.0 indicates ideal separation, i.e., there exists a threshold for which no detection errors occur. On the other hand, an AUC of 0.5 indicates that the binary classifier is no more successful than flipping a coin.
An example of a scatterplot and the corresponding ROC curve is given in Fig. 5 . The solid red circles in the scatterplot represent positive instances, while the hollow blue squares represent negative instances. In the context of malware classification, the circles would be scores for malware files, while the squares are scores for benign files, assuming that higher scores are "better". That is, for this particular score, positive instances are supposed to score higher than negative instances.
If, for example, we place the threshold at the yellow line in the scatterplot in Fig. 5 , the true positive rate (TPR) is 0.7, since 7 of the 10 positive instances are classified correctly, while the false positive rate (FPR) is 0.2, since 2 of the 10 negative cases lie on the wrong side of the threshold. This gives us the point (0.2, 0.7) on the ROC curve, which is illustrated by the black circle on the ROC graph in Fig. 5 . The shaded region in Fig. 5 represents the AUC which, in this example is 0.75. 
Experiments and results
This section provides details of our experimental results. First we give results for EM and K -means clustering based on compiler models. Then we consider a similar cluster analysis based on malware scores. We then do comparable experiments using SVMs. All of the underlying scores used for clustering and SVMs are based on HMMs trained on various datasets. First, we discuss the tools and datasets used in the subsequent experiments.
Tools
To generate HMM models, we used the tools developed in previous research [2, 3] . These tools are consistent with the HMM development given in [22] . We used the RapidMiner [18] to generate SVMs. An SVM model is trained on a subset of each malware family. Then using the files that were not part of the training set, we determine how well the trained model can classify samples from the malware family. We use the same HMM scores that we use for clustering to train and test the SVM models. The SVM serves to combine multiple HMM scores into a single classifier. Also, these SVM experiments serve as a sort of control, in the sense of providing results that we can compare to our more speculative clustering experiments.
The Matlab Statistics Toolbox [13] was used to implement the clustering algorithms. This toolbox provides functions for both the K -means and EM clustering.
Datasets
Most of the malware datasets used for this research were obtained from the Malicia project website [15] . The Malicia dataset consists of more than 11,000 malware binaries collected from 500 drive-by download servers over a period of 11 months. All of the malware samples are in the form of executable (.exe) or dynamic-link library (.dll) files. Along with the malware samples, Malicia includes a database of metadata. The metadata gives information as to when and where the malware was collected and, in most cases, the classification of the malware. Of the 11,000 malware samples in the dataset, about 7,800 were distributed among three dominant families, namely, Winwebsec, Zbot, and Zeroaccess. Our analysis is primarily focused on these three dominant datasets, but we do consider four additional datasets in some of our experiments. A brief description of each of these malware families follows.
• Winwebsec is fake anti-virus software. An infected system displays messages claiming malicious activity and attempts to convince the user to pay money for software to clean the supposedly infected system [12] .
• Zbot also known as Zeus, is a Trojan horse that compromises a system by downloading configuration files or updates. Zbot is a stealth virus that hides in the file system [25] .
• ZeroAccess is a Trojan horse that makes use of an advanced rootkit to hide its presence. ZeroAccess can create a new hidden file system, it can create a backdoor on the compromised system, and it can download additional malware [26] .
• Harebot is a backdoor that provides remote access to the infected system. Because of its many features, it is also considered to be a rootkit [9] .
• Security Shield is a Trojan that, like Winwebsec, claims to be anti-virus software. Security Shield reports fake virus detection messages and attempts to coerce the users into purchasing software [19] .
• Smart HDD reports various problems with the hard drive and tries to convince the user to purchase a product to fix these "errors". Smart HDD is named after S.M.A.R.T., which is a legitimate tool that monitors hard disk drives (HDDs) [21].
• NGVCK (Next Generation Virus Construction Kit) is a highly metamorphic generator [16] . This family has been analyzed in several previous research studies, including [3, 31] .
As in several previous malware studies [4, 20, 31] , we use 32-bit Cygwin utility files as our representative benign samples. Table 3 lists the number of samples from each malware family and the benign set.
All malware and benign files were disassembled using IDA Pro [10] , and opcodes were extracted from the disassembled files. All HMM models were trained on sequences of opcodes, and for all HMMs we use N = 2 hidden states. Of course, for the resulting models, socring is also based on extracted opcode sequences. Furthermore, all scores are computed in the form of a log likelihood per opcode, so that sequences of differing length can be compared.
Compiler models
As in previous research [2, 3] , for this set of experiments we trained an HMM on each of four different compilers (GCC, MinGW, TurboC, Clang), hand written assembly code (TASM), and one metamorphic malware family (NGVCK). The number of assembly files used for training each model is given in Table 4 .
Each of the malware and benign files in Table 3 was scored against each of the seven HMMs obtained from the files in Table 4 . Each model should assign higher scores to files that are more similar to the data used to train the model. This results in a 7-tuple of scores for each file in the test set. These 7-tuples of scores obtained from the HMMs were used to generate clusters as follows. A subset of the files in Table 3 was used to generate a cluster model. The files in Table 3 that were not used to generate the clusters were then clustered. The number of samples used to generate the cluster models (clustering) and the number used for testing are given in Table 5 The idea here is that in the clustering phase, we generate clusters based on known samples. Then in the testing phase, we attempt to classify new samples based on these existing clusters. To measure the effectiveness of such an approach, we need a means of assigning a score to each file in the testing phase, based on its assigned cluster. In this experiment, we use cluster purity (as discussed in Sect. 2.2.3) to assign a score.
For example, suppose that in the testing phase, we assign a Zbot file to a cluster that, based on the clustering phase, contains 200 files, of which 150 are Zbot, 20 are Zeroaccess and 30 are benign. Then the score assigned to this Zbot file is 150/200 = 0.75.
The results for these experiments are summarized in Table 6 and in the form of line graphs in Fig. 6 . For these experiments, we give scores for both the EM and K -means algorithms, where the number of clusters K ranges from 2 to 15. From these results we see that EM performs marginally better than K -means. Given that the scores are based solely on the purity of clusters, and that there are four different categories (i.e., three malware families, and benign), the results appear to be impressive. Also, note that in this experiment, we have generated clusters based on HMM models that do not include any of the families in our test set. Yet, we are able to classify samples based on these clusters with a reasonably high degree of accuracy. Another interesting aspect of the results in Fig. 6 is that we obtain improvement up to about nine clusters, but beyond that point, the scores do not improve significantly. Apparently, with more clusters, we tend to obtain more pure clusters, but only up to a point.
These results, which are consistent with those presented in [2] , show that clustering can serve as a valuable tool for classifying malware.
Detecting new malware families
For the first in this set of experiments, we produce three HMM models, one for each of the malware families, Winwebsec, Zbot, and ZeroAccess. Clusters are generated based on the HMM scores for two of the families. We then determine how accurately we can classify the third family using these clusters. That is, we use the third family to simulate a new malware family that was was not part of the training.
As in our previous experiments, we need a method to compute scores based on clusters. The basis for our score is the silhouette coefficient, as discussed in Sect. 2.2.3. Recall that the silhouette coefficient combines cohesion and separation into one number.
Suppose that we are given a set of clusters, C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C K and a data point x, where x is an element of cluster C j . We compute S(x), the silhouette coefficient of x. Next, we calculate M j = number of malware samples in cluster C j (2) and B j = number of benign samples in cluster C j
Then we define scoring functions
That is, score M (x) is the malware score assigned to x, while score B (x) is the benign score assigned to x. The larger S(x), the more confidence we have that x is properly clustered. Our score weights S(x) by the "purity" of the cluster that x belongs to, where the purity is with respect to malware versus benign. For example, consider the case where Winwebsec and Zbot act as our known families, with Zeroaccess acting as the previously unknown family. Then using HMMs trained on Winwebsec and Zbot, we compute a 2-tuple of scores for all Winwebsec and Zbot files in their respective test sets, as well as all benign files. Next, we cluster these known files. Based on these clustering results, we compute M j and B j in Eqs. (2) and (3), respectively. Next, given x in the Zeroaccess family, we compute its 2-tuple of scores using the HMM models for Winwebsec and Zbot. Based on these scores, we assign x to its appropriate cluster, say, C j . Then we compute S(x) and, finally, score M (x) and score B (x). In this way, we score all x in the Zeroaccess family. The results of this experiment, for both K -means and EM clustering and K = 2 clusters are are given in the "2-dimension" column in Fig. 7 .
We performed analogous experiments with 3-dimensional and 4-dimensional scores. In the 3-dimension case, we included all three malware family scores (Winwebsec, Zbot, and Zeroaccess). In the 4-dimension case, we included all three family scores, plus scores from the NGVCK metamorphic generator model. These AUC results are also included in Table 7 .
K -means versus EM clustering
Next, we compare the performance of EM and K -means clustering based on a straightforward measure of accuracy. For these experiments, we only distinguish between malware and benign. Suppose that cluster C contains more malware samples than benign samples. Then in the testing phase, any sample that is assigned to cluster C is classified as malware. On the other hand, if cluster C contains more benign samples than malware, any test sample that is assigned to cluster C is classified as benign.
Accuracy is computed in terms of the proportion of samples that are classified correctly or not. For a given experiment, we have the following definitions.
• In the ideal case, all samples are correctly classified, and the accuracy is 1.0. In general, the closer the accuracy is to 1.0, the better. We calculate the accuracy of both EM and K -means clustering as the number of clusters K varies from 2 to 15. In each experiment, the clustering is based on the HMM malware family models. Here, we vary the number of scores used from 2 to 7, and we refer to the number of scores as the "dimension". The specific set of models used in each experiment are given in Table 8 . Figure 7 shows the accuracy of K -means clustering as the number of dimensions ranges from from 2 to 7 (the x-axis) and the number of clusters K ranges from 2 to 15 (the yaxis) The analogous results for EM clustering are given in Fig. 8 . In all of these experiments, we achieve an accuracy of greater than 0.8, with the best cases for K -means and EM both exceeding 0.98.
The K -means results in Fig. 7 show a clear improving trend as the number of clusters increases from 2 to 5, but minimal improvement for K > 5. Also, for K -means, it appears that beyond five dimensions, increasing the number Fig. 8 are more mixed, indicating that for this particular application, EM is significantly more sensitive to the selection of parameters than K -means. That is, for EM clustering, care must be taken to optimize the choice of K and the selection of scores (i.e., dimensions). On the other hand, for K -means, we simply need to exceed a threshold for K and a threshold for the number of dimensions, and we can then expect the results to be nearly optimal.
SVM for compiler models
We conducted SVM experiments comparable to the clustering experiments discussed above. These can be viewed as serving as controls, in the sense that they provide a point of reference for our clustering results. For the first SVM experiment, we use the same 7-tuples of compiler scores as in the experiments in Sects. 3.3 and 3.5 above, and we use the same training and test sets that were used for clustering. On significant difference is that the training set for the clustering algorithms did not contain benign samples, whereas benign samples must be explicitly included when training the SVM.
For the SVM, there are a variety of standard kernel functions. In Table 9 , we give results for five kernel functions, four of which yield optimal results. These results are particularly impressive, given that none of the HMMs used to compute the 7-tuple of scores was derived from the malware families used in this experiment. The comparable clustering results are given in Table 6 , where the best case yields an AUC of about 0.82. From this perspective, the clustering technique does not appear to be particularly impressive. In any case, this experiment clearly shows the strength of the SVM when used to combine scores.
SVM to distinguish malware families
For our final experiment, we generate an SVM model to test 2-dimensional malware scores. Specifically, we train an SVM model on a subset of Zbot and Winwebsec samples and we test the model on the remaining Zbot and Winwebsec samples. Our goal is to determine how well the SVM can distinguish between families, using these 2-dimensional HMM scores. Since SVMs are well-suited for combining scores, we expect strong results in this case. We performed analogous experiments using 3-dimensional and 4-dimensional scores. The AUC results for these experiment, using various kernel functions, are given in the form of a bar graph in Fig. 9 . These experiments are somewhat analogous to the clustering results in Sect. 3.4, which are summarized in Figs. 7 and 8 . Figure 10 provides a comparison of our malware clustering results and the SVM results. The clustering results in Fig. 10 are taken from Table 7 . These results show that we can obtain results via clustering that are comparable to those obtained using SVMs. This is impressive, given that the SVM was trained specifically to distinguish a given malware family from benign, whereas the clusters were simply generated based on pre-existing malware families, without any reference to the benign set.
Discussion
Our experimental results show that clustering can be used to detect malware families with good accuracy-in some cases, comparable to results obtained with a Support Vector Machine. These results indicate that via clustering we can detect samples from a new malware family with reasonable accuracy even before we have recognized the existence of a new family. As a practical matter, this approach could be used as a first line of defense against new malware. This technique could also be used as part of a process designed to automatically filter out new malware samples for further analysis, thus enabling us to generate a model specific to a new malware family more quickly than might otherwise be possible.
Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we compared the accuracy of two clustering algorithms, namely, EM and K -means. We also compared our clustering results to those obtained using Support Vector Machines. Our experiments are based on a large dataset with more than 7800 malware samples. In one set of experiments, malware and benign samples were scored against a variety of compiler models, where the models were trained using HMMs. That is, we trained a different HMM on each of several compilers. Then we clustered malware samples based on these scores, and we used the resulting clusters to distinguish malware from benign. In comparing these results to an SVM, we found, not surprisingly, that the SVM performed significantly better. These experiments show the inherent strength of SVMs for problems of this type.
In another set of experiments, we again clustered malware samples based on HMM scores. However, in this case the underlying HMMs were based on malware families. We then used the resulting clusters to classify samples from a malware family that was not modeled by any of the HMMs. Perhaps surprisingly, we obtained results that are comparable to those obtained using an SVM. But, to use an SVM in this scenario, we would have to recognize the new family, collect samples, and train an SVM using the samples from this new family. In contrast, the clustering results were obtained without any such effort, that is, we used the same models and technique as would have been used before the new malware family appeared. This indicates that clustering is potentially a powerful tool for detecting previously unknown malware. Such a use case would be particularly valuable in the early stages of a malware attack, before the malware has been diagnosed and samples collected for analysis.
It would be interesting to further explore the utility of clustering within the context of malware detection. The results in this paper indicate that clustering can be a useful tool in the challenging case where a new malware family appears. Clustering also would be useful for the related problem of early collection and diagnosis of samples from a new malware family.
